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THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HIGH SPEED VESSELS RELATIVE TO 





This cost-benefit analysis conducted on behalf of MSC compared HSVs against 
C-17 aircraft.  Using financial and operational data garnered from the WestPac Express, 
as well as third-party research, the researchers investigated the following questions:  Is 
the HSV a better choice for intra-theater lift than AMC?  Should DoD buy or lease? 
Should the crew be military or civilian?  What other theaters require an intra-theater lift 
platform?  How many HSVs does DoD need? 
The results indicate that in ranges of up to 1,500 nautical miles, HSVs have a 
speed advantage over C-17 airlift.  One HSV can move a single battalion of Marines, 
whereas AMC requires seventeen C-17 aircraft, a number rarely available for such a 
mission.  Additionally, during routine FY03 operations, WestPac Express incurred costs 
of $12 million.  This saved $8.7 million compared to an estimated AMC cost of $20.7 
million.  The study also recommends bareboat leasing to take advantage of the increased 
operational flexibility.  In the absence of significant cost differences, civilian manning is 
superior to military manning due to organizational fit.  The study concludes with a 
recommendation that MSC institutionalize HSV service in the III MEF AOR and expand 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  HIGH SPEED FERRIES 
 New technologies have emerged in recent years that will alter the way we bring 
our military forces to the fight.  These technologies, merging with operational concepts 
such as Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing, inspire the Navy’s transformation efforts.  
Enhanced naval capabilities are essential to these concepts and will alter the way we 
operate on the high seas.  High Speed Vessels (HSVs) are one of the platforms that will 
push our transformational efforts onward.   
High-speed ferries (HSF) and catamaran-hulled ships have been used primarily as 
passenger ferries in the commercial sector.  They have proven to be reliable, cost 
efficient, and quicker than traditional mono-hulled ferries, and they offer passengers a 
comfortable ride.  Whereas most mono-hulled ships travel at speeds around 15 knots, 
HSVs reach top speeds of over 40 knots and travel at sustained speeds of over 30 knots 
when fully laden.  In short, HSVs double the speed at which current maritime technology 
travels.   
 In 1999, the Royal Australian Navy used a HSF, the HMAS Jervis Bay, to 
support its forces while conducting humanitarian operations in East Timor.  The 
impressive performance of the HMAS Jervis Bay as a logistics support vessel (LSV) 
gained the attention of military officials within DoD.  Not only did the HMAS Jervis Bay 
perform exceptionally well, but also it required only minimal alterations in order to 
undertake a military mission.1  Most important, HMAS Jervis Bay was commercial off- 
the-shelf technology (COTS), allowing defense establishments to attain the capability 
without paying R&D costs.  Ironically, the impetus for the charter of HMAS Jervis Bay 
was the unavailability of two recently purchased former US tank landing ships (LSTs).  
The vessels had been purchased to provide the Australian army with an expeditionary 
capability and were undergoing refit.2  In 2001, the U.S. Navy and Army leased a HSF 
manufactured by Incat of Australia.  Each service was given time to conduct operational 
tests and evaluate the vessel.  The Navy is interested in having HSVs fulfill many roles 
while the Army is interested in their intra-theater lift capabilities.  The U.S. Marines also 
have an interest in HSV technology.  III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), located 
in Okinawa, Japan, conducts training throughout the Western Pacific region.  Previously 
III MEF relied upon the US Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC) to shuttle troops 
 
1 Higgins and March, pg 12. 
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from garrison to training grounds and exercises in Guam, Thailand, Korea and the 
Japanese mainland 80 percent of the time. 3  To move a Marine battalion requires 
seventeen C-17 lifts.  However, sufficient aircraft to move the unit in one lift were 
usually not available.  Consequently, such a mission would typically take fourteen days.  
With the availability of an organic asset such as HSV, III MEF acquired the capability to 
move a Marine battalion with its equipment within theater more quickly and more 
efficiently than airlift, reducing the time required for such moves to four days.   
Although the III MEF experience has been positive, the decision to acquire new 
technologies such as HSV must be backed by solid analysis to ensure the right capability 
is purchased for the right reasons at the appropriate price.  Based upon an accurate 
analysis, DoD’s acquisition of new technologies must ensure that the American taxpayer 
receives equipment that enhances the military’s capabilities and makes sense financially.  
Before investing significant time and money into furthering the use of HSVs in DoD, 
sufficient analysis must show that fast sealift for DoD is the appropriate choice for the 
future.   
B.  AREA OF ANALYSIS  
 III MEF, due to its location, has training requirements that preclude it from 
conducting all its training on the island of Okinawa.  As a result, considerable travel to 
and from training ranges is required.  Since February 2002, the Austal-built HSV 
WestPac Express has served III MEF to take troops to and from training ranges and 
international exercises located throughout the theater.  Prior to the charter of WestPac 
Express, III MEF relied heavily upon AMC for transportation of personnel and 
equipment.   
Military Sealift Command (MSC) requires a cost-benefit analysis to determine if 
the purchase or lease of more HSVs is warranted.  HSVs would act as a solution to 
medium-lift intra-theater transportation needs.  However, at what point does the use of an 
HSV become more cost-efficient than AMC flights? 
1.  Research Questions 
1.1  Is HSV a better choice for intra-theater lift than AMC? 
1.2  Should DoD buy or lease? 
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1.4  What other theaters require an intra-theater lift platform?  How many HSVs 
does DoD need? 
C.  SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
A cost-benefit analysis is important in any business process.  Costs are generally 
thought of as quantitative, while benefits may be both quantitative and qualitative. All 
factors, quantitative and qualitative, must be factored in.  To estimate the value of HSVs, 
we compared WestPac Express data to the closest supplement: the Air Force C-17.  The 
analysis is based upon cost data provided by MSC, personal research, and in-depth 
analysis conducted by third parties.   
As the organization responsible for chartering WestPac Express, MSC has 
collected large volumes of data: financial data, logistical data, fuel records and port costs.  
We draw conclusions from the evaluation of WestPac Express and assume other vessels 
of similar size and capability would have approximately the same costs and benefits. 
Also, other relevant DoD experience with HSVs is considered.  The goal is to 
draw lessons from these specifics and form a conclusion regarding the suitability of 
HSVs to MSC needs, not to justify WestPac Express. 
A limitation of the study is the lack of comparable C-17 data.  It requires 
seventeen C-17s to equal one WestPac Express lift.  Rarely is that number of aircraft 
available at one time.  AMC can augment missions with other types of aircraft; however, 
the C-17 is considered the current and future backbone for airlift. 
A further limitation is the lack of one consistent definition of what constitutes 
intra-theater and inter-theater lift.  For example, AMC considers C-130s as its primary 
AMC intra-theater lift asset, however, they lack the size and speed of the C-17 and can 
move very little of a battalion’s heavy gear.  HSVs, just like C-17s can be refueled and 
have circumnavigated the Globe and have no difficulty crossing oceans.  For the purpose 
of this study, intra-theater lift is considered to not exceed 2,500 nautical miles (NM).  
This is twice the un-refueled range of the WestPac Express and describes the expected 
operating environment of current HSVs.  Also, it eliminates from consideration 
movement of materiel from the United States to East Asia or Europe, which are areas of 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  HISTORY 
 In 1999, Australia accepted the lead in a United Nations peacekeeping mission in 
East Timor.  Due to the unavailability of recently purchased American LSTs, which were 
undergoing refit, the Australian military lacked adequate sealift capability to support its 
expeditionary force.  The Australian military took the unorthodox step of leasing a High 
Speed Vessel (HSV) and commissioned her into service as HMAS Jervis Bay.  During 
her two years of service, HMAS Jervis Bay routinely shuttled back and forth on the 430-
nautical-mile route between Darwin, Australia and Dili, East Timor, sometimes 
conducting three runs per week.  The program was seen by the Australian military as a 
success and introduced a new capability to western militaries fast sealift. 4  
III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), forward deployed in Okinawa, was the 
first U.S. force to embrace this capability.  Via MSC, a time charter was signed with the 
Australian manufacturer Austal for the HSV WestPac Express.  The experience gained 
through this program and other US government HSV initiatives indicates that HSVs 
provide a solution to medium lift, intra-theater requirements. 
      1.  MSC Background 
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is one of three component commands of the 
US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), which is responsible for meeting the 
transportation needs of the Department of Defense (DoD).  MSC oversees the maritime 
component.  Its mission is “to provide ocean transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies 
and ammunition to sustain U.S. forces worldwide during peacetime and in war for as long 
as operational requirements dictate.”5 
B.  WESTPAC EXPRESS 
The WestPac Express is capable of sustaining 36 knots while transporting 500 
dead weight tons.6  WestPac Express has proven its ability to transport 400 tons of 
equipment and 370 Marines from Okinawa to Guam in approximately 40 hours.  It is able  
 
4 Polson 
5 MSC web site: [http://www.msc.navy.mil/N00P/mission.htm] 
6 Austal web site: [http://www.austal-ships.com/range/military.cfm] 
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III MEF uses the vessel as an intra-theater lift platform to tr
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million (FY98 constant dollars)10.  It has a global range with in-flight refueling and can 
travel at a speed of 450 knots at 28,000 feet.11   
 Table 2: C-17 Characteristics 
Range Global with in-flight refueling 
Load 170,900 lbs or 102 troops 
Cargo Space 88 ft x 18 ft x 12 ft 4 in 
Length 174 ft 
Wingspan 169 ft 10 in 
Height 55 ft 1 in 
Speed 450kts at 28,000 ft 
Engines 4 X Pratt & Whitney F117 turbofan 
Thrust 44,440 lbs, each engine 
Source: US Air Force Fact Sheet 
D.  TIME  CONSIDERATIONS 
 When comparing two modes of transportation, total cycle time should be 
considered.  How long does it take assembled Unit X to travel from Garrison A to 
Country B and reassemble as a fighting unit?  Using this holistic approach as opposed to 
merely comparing platform speeds, an HSV transporting a Marine battalion will take less 
time than seventeen C-17s in distances up to 1250 nautical miles.  For example, III MEF 
planners routinely assume four hours for an embark operation.  It may take longer based 
on the complexity of the load and the experience of the handling crew.  It can take less 
than an hour if the load consists of rolling stock and personnel only.  Assuming a fully 
loaded HSV speed of 42 knots and C-17 speed of 450 knots, as well as a combined 
harbor embark/debark time of 8 hours versus a combined airport embark/debark time of 2 
hours per plane, the HSV will be faster for any distance up to 1250 miles.  However, 
AMC rarely has seventeen C-17s available at a time for a routine airlift.  The total active 
duty, Air National Guard inventory is only 64, with a goal of 134.12 
                                                 
10 U.S. Air Force fact sheet 
11 ibid 
12 ibid 
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 Furthermore, AMC touts full and partial mission availability rates for the C-17 of 
74.7 and 82.5 percent, with “only 20 aircraft maintenance man-hours per flying hour”.13  
This makes it the most reliable of AMC assets in its inventory.  The WestPac Express has 
“never missed an operational requirement due to mechanical failure”14 and requires only 
0.45 maintenance hours per engine hour15. 
 C-17 travel, even if all 17 airplanes are available (in most routine missions they 
are not), is severely constricted by the limitations of the airport as a transportation node.  
For example, most airports have at most two runaways, allowing only two airplanes to 
land or take off at a time.  Also, the administrative task of dividing the battalion and 
loading onto the aircraft is much more complicated and time-intensive versus the 
relatively straightforward loading of the HSV (walk-on, walk-off).  III MEF experience 
with the WestPac Express indicated a reduction in time allotted for moving a Marine 
Battalion from fourteen days to four days. 
                                                 
13 ibid 
14 interview with MAJ Howard, III MEF 
15 interview with Captain Ken Kujala, WestPac Express 
   
 9
Also, in the case of III MEF, the WestPac Express had an
benefit.  Travel time to and from Kadena Air Base is eliminated.
Express can load at Kin Red pier, which is directly adjacent to th
hence the Marines can save themselves a longer trip through con
civilian traffic to Kadena.  Time required per mission is thus red
Furthermore, the impact of U.S. military presence on the civilian
AMC airlift is superior when moving large numbers of p
For example, moving personnel from the U.S. into Iraq quickly i
efficiently via airlift.   Also, movement of small packages is don
aircraft. Source:  US Air Force
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E.  INCREASED FLEXIBILITY 
 The WestPac Express was designed for a Greek ferry operator who went 
bankrupt.  Therefore it has some operational shortcomings that have been addressed in 
Incat’s 112-m military design and Austal’s 125-m design.  These designs are slight 
modifications of the baseline model and have not resulted in over specialization of this 
platform.  Over specialization is the biggest danger faced by non-developmental items 
(NDI).  It is the growth of military requirements placed on commercial products.  The 
true benefit of an NDI is when the commercial role matches the military role.  However, 
military planners are prone to ask for more capability, which leads to a cost increase.  The 
more a product specializes to military demands, the greater the cost difference with a 
similar commercial item.  An HSV is essentially a large, open platform that provides 
electricity and air conditioning.  The WestPac Express has a 4-m draft, making the vast 
majority of ports in the World accessible.  The WestPac Express can carry every item in 
the Marine Corps inventory with the exception of fixed wing aircraft, the H-53 helicopter 
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and the M1-A1 tank.  Its stern facing ramp and lack of heavy anchors limit the WestPac 
Express.  Heavy anchors are necessary to conduct a med moor (the ship moors 
perpendicular to the pier with its stern closest; this is a common practice in the 
Mediterranean, but requires two solid anchor points).  Without them, the WestPac 
Express requires an L-shaped pier to load/unload.  The 112-m HSV design corrects these 
limitations.  With the exception of fixed wing aircraft, it can carry every piece of 
equipment in the Marine Corps inventory and its slew able ramp obviates the need for an 
L-shaped pier.  This will open up the majority of the World’s ports to HSV service. 
 Source:  Global Security .org
 Additionally, the WestPac Express has been able to conduct at-sea refueling using 
the astern refueling method, thus increasing operational range.  The 112-m is not 
expected to add a Standard Tensioned Refueling Alongside Method rig.  However, the 
112-m design adds a flight deck, thus further increasing operational uses.  The 
mechanical reliability of the WestPac Express has been excellent.  It essentially has not 
missed operational requirements due to mechanical failure.16  This is much improved 
over AMC performance.  The only real limitation is weather.  A 4-m or greater head sea 
(a head sea refers to the situation when the ship’s bow “heads” into the waves) does not 
allow WestPac Express operations.  This is equivalent to Sea State 6.  Additionally, the 
lack of draft translates into greater susceptibility to wind.  Sustained 25-knot winds can 
preclude loading and unloading operations.  As an aside, the WestPac Express’ ramp 
provides a lot of stability to the ship when extended on the pier.  When loading 
helicopters, two forklifts have to lift the ramp to a level parallel with the main deck 
because the angle is too steep to push the helicopter up the ramp.  Instead, a crane lifts the 
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helicopter onto the raised ramp.  However, due to stability considerations this action is 
possible only in virtually windless weather conditions. 
 
16 Conversation with Captain Ken Kujala, WestPac Express and MAJ Howard, III MEF  
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III.  FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A.  COSTS 
 The financial data includes a breakdown of charter costs, fuel costs, port costs and 
overhead for the WestPac Express.  Charter costs are considered fixed costs in that they 
are incurred whether the HSV is used or not.  Charter costs include personnel costs and 
maintenance costs and are therefore a good baseline for buy-versus-lease comparisons.  
Variable costs are fuel costs and port costs and occur only when III MEF uses the HSV.  
MSC charges III MEF an overhead expense of 4 percent of the total costs, fixed and 
variable. 
B.  ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
 The Total Fixed HSV costs added to Total Variable HSV costs divided by the 
AMC price per passenger-mile determines how many passenger-miles the HSV has to 
travel for the total cost of the HSV to equal AMC cost.  A passenger-mile is the product 
of passengers and miles moved.  For example, moving 1 passenger 100 miles equals 100 
passenger-miles; moving 5 passengers, 20 miles, equals 100 passenger-miles, etc 
 The Total Fixed HSV costs added to Total Variable HSV costs divided by the 
AMC price per lb-mile determines how many lb-miles the HSV has to travel for the total 
cost of the HSV to equal AMC cost.  For ease of analysis, we then divided by 2000 to 
convert to short-ton-miles.  A short-ton-mile is the product of short tons and miles 
moved.  For example, moving 1 short ton 100 miles equals 100 short ton-miles; moving 5 
short tons, 20 miles, equals 100 short ton-miles, etc. 
C.  FINANCIAL BENEFITS 
 Analysis of WestPac Express financial data indicated the following: 
In FY02, the HSV accumulated 10.5 million passenger-miles and 8.1 million short ton-
miles at a cost of 8.2 million dollars.  The AMC cost would have been 9.3 million dollars, 
thus resulting in savings of 1.1 million dollars.  The cost of the HSV did not equal the 
AMC cost (or break-even) until 34.6 million passenger-miles or 9.2 million short ton-
miles. 
Table 3: FY02 HSV break-even analysis 
FY02 WestPac Express 
Passenger-Miles 10,544,466
Short Ton-Miles 8,109,739
Cost – U.S. $ 8,158,436
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AMC Cost – U.S. $ 9,329,418





In FY03, the HSV accumulated 17.3 million passenger-miles and 12.2 million 
short ton-miles at a cost of $12 million.  This saved $8.7 million compared to an 
estimated AMC cost of $20.7 million.  This indicates a break-even point of 50.6 million 
passenger-miles per year or 4.2 million passenger-miles per month (12-month basis).  
This is the equivalent of moving 500 personnel, 1000 miles, 8 times each month.  The 
break-even point moving cargo is reached at 9.7 million short ton-miles per year or 
810,000 short ton-miles per month (12-month basis).  This is the equivalent of moving 
400 short tons, twice, over a distance of 1000 miles. 
Table 4: FY03 HSV break-even analysis 
FY03 WestPac Express 
Passenger-Miles 17,328,859
Short Ton-Miles 12,184,568
Cost – U.S. $ 12,039,458
AMC Cost – U.S. $ 20,739,789





 A difficulty with this comparison is that it compares customer mixed costs with 
customer variable costs between two DoD assets.  The cost of the HSV in this analysis is 
mixed: consisting of fixed costs (the charter) and variable costs (fuel and port costs).  
HSV fixed costs accrue whether the vessel is used or not.  The additional variable costs 
account for up to 39 percent of monthly cost.  AMC costs are variable costs based on flat 
rates charged per passenger-mile or lb-mile.  These charges occur only when cargo is 
moved.  Consequently, as use of the HSV goes up, the fixed costs become spread out 
over more passenger-miles or lb-miles, thus making it more attractive under high usage 
rates. 
 Second, we do not have a complete understanding of AMC costs.  Activity-Based 
Costing (ABC) is an accounting method used to allocate all relevant costs to an activity.  
For example, intra-theater C-17 airlift would not only include the cost of fuel, 
maintenance, and aircrew, but depreciation of aircraft, cost of aircrew training, cost of 
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airfields, etc.  Naturally, AMC freight rates try to cover operating costs, but without ABC 
data we cannot have an accurate marginal cost per C-17 flight.  Therefore, true costs in 
this analysis may be lower or higher. 
D.  FINANCIAL RISK 
 Statistical simulation software allows for assessment of financial risk.  For 
example, by using FY03 financial information as the median value with a ten percent 
standard deviation and a normal distribution, a simulation can be run that indicates the 
result of possible cost variations.  This indicated that the maximum break-even point for 
passenger-miles was 70 million.  This equates to 5.8 million passenger-miles per month 
(12-month basis) and would require moving 500 personnel, 1000-nautical miles a dozen 
times.  Break-even for cargo reached a maximum of 14 million short ton-miles per year.  
This translates to 1.2 million short ton-miles per month (12-month basis), or moving 400 
short tons, 1000-nautical miles, three times.  WestPac Express currently exceeds these 
levels. 
E.  OPPORTUNITY COST 
 Any cost-benefit analysis is not complete without considering opportunity cost, or 
what else could be purchased with the resources expended.  HSVs offer some cost 
savings over traditional airlift, as well as time savings within their operating range.  
Additionally they offer capabilities not duplicated elsewhere in the US military.  Finally, 
their essential nature as an open platform provides flexibility to innovative ideas not yet 
imagined.  The purchase cost of a single HSV is approximately $100 million.  The 
creation of a global HSV service (Okinawa, Med, Arabian Gulf/Red Sea, East 
Coast/Caribbean, West Coast/Hawaii) would cost an estimated $500 million.  However, 
with leasing, this could be reduced to less than a third of that cost per year.  Alternatively, 
$500 million could buy two C-17s.  However, if the creation of an institutional HSV 
service can reduce the Air Force requirement for more C-17s by two, then the program 
would be paid for immediately.   
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[General] Handy [Commander, TRANSCOM] is on record as saying the currently 
planned procurement of only 180 C-17s is insufficient.  He contended that the real 
requirement even under the oldand now outmodedMRS-05 [DoD’s most current 
Mobility Requirements Study] standard was more like 222 C-17s.  Today’s need would 
go even higher.17 
 
DoD policy makers need to decide whether the resources expended on HSVs are a 
worthwhile investment or whether the money can bring more benefit elsewhere. 
 
Source: Austal
   
A 112-m HSV built to military transport specification would cost an estimated $100 
million.18  It would allow the movement of a Marine battalion including equipment.  The 
range of the WestPac Express is 1,500 miles at 32 knots fully loaded, or 42 knots empty.  
The 112-m HSV is expected to exceed current HSV performance in all aspects. 
F.  LEASE OR BUY 
 Leasing allows for a reduction in technology risk.  If a new technology makes 
HSVs less desirable or obsolete, all MSC has to do is not renew the lease.  This provides 
an incentive to the owners to continuously update the vessels with new technology.  
Additionally, this same mechanism protects MSC from acquiring poor quality ships.  An 
owner would not want to have a lease terminated because of poor material condition.  Of 
course, the greater the expected improvement in technology, the higher will be the annual 
lease rate because the existing HSV will become more obsolescent.19  
                                                 
17 Tirpak, pg 25 
18 NWDC web site 
19 conversation with Dr. David R. Henderson, NPS 
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 With a lease the thorny question of disposal is no longer a DoD issue.  The recent 
furor about low-cost, but environmentally unsafe disposal of US military ships in India is 
a good example.20  The Navy has 94 inactive ships with 65 slated for disposal.  The 
current budget allocates only $5 million, with the estimated cost of U.S. disposal of a 
Spruance-class destroyer at $4 million.  At that rate, it will take almost a century to get 
rid of yesterday’s fleet, not to mention the hulks on hand at the Maritime Administration 
(MARAD).  Ship disposal in the U.S. can be very expensive. .  However, upon expiration 
of the lease, the HSV could simply be returned to the owner.  
 For leasing to be a viable option, HSVs have to be protected from “requirement 
creep.”  The military has a history of maximizing technology for its uses, not optimizing.   
For example, the Army made a requirement that its trucks had to be airdrop capable.  
This capability puts severe stress on a truck and required extensive re-engineering effort 
ranging from shock testing to making the vehicle fit into the aircraft.  Very few trucks are 
air dropped by the Army, but all had to meet that requirement.  This incremental increase 
in capability was purchased at a vast increase in cost. 21   HSVs face the same danger.  
Specialization will make HSVs more expensive and potentially less attractive as a 
transportation solution.  Additionally, if the vessel becomes so specialized that the builder 
cannot return it to the commercial market, then leasing will no longer be an option. 
Incidentally, the Army’s Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM) is leasing its 
TSVs.22 
G.  TIME CHARTER VERSUS BAREBOAT CHARTER 
 The WestPac Express is currently operated under a time charter, which gives 
MSC use of the HSV’s transportation services for a specified period of time.  This 
agreement is analogous to a limousine service, where the customer can call on the 
services of the car for the period paid for.  The vessel is leased for III MEF by MSC from 
Austal.  The actual operation of the WestPac Express has been subcontracted to 
Hornblower.  The advantage here is that, just as with a rental car, DoD does not worry 
about maintenance or force protection.  For example, Force Protection is required only 
when the Marines use the WestPac Express in operations.  Additionally, maintenance is 
an issue for Austal and Hornblower, not MSC.  This may not translate into significant 
cost savings, but reduces some of the hassle of “ownership”. 
 
20 Shipbreakers, Revisited 
21 COL Boudreau, USA, Ret., NPS 
22 Baumgardner   




 On the other hand, a time charter limits the operational flexibility of the vessel.  
For example, under a time charter, the WestPac Express falls under Coast Guard 
jurisdiction.  For transporting HAZMAT, Coast Guard regulations are much more 
stringent than Navy regulations.  For example, during a recent move of helicopters 
onboard the WestPac Express, air crew had to empty all the embarked aircrafts’ JP-5 
tanks.  Furthermore, all embarked gear and vehicles had to be carefully inventoried. 23   
Under a bareboat charter, this would not be the case.  A bareboat charter is akin to a long-
term automotive lease where the customer is responsible for all aspects of the vehicles 
maintenance and operation, but does not own it outright. Furthermore, a bareboat charter 
would allow the HSV for such innovative uses as hospital ship, special warfare mother 
ship, or mine warfare asset.  These functions could not be accommodated under a time 
charter. 
 Under a bareboat charter, MSC would assume control of the vessel and provide 
for maintenance and force protection.  On the other hand, this would allow for full 
integration of HSVs into the fleet.  Secure communications can be installed; the full 
range of operational concepts can be executed and regulatory burdens can be reduced. 
H.  CIVILIAN CREW VERSUS MILITARY CREW 
 MSC handles maritime logistics for DoD.  It does so with a mostly civilian work 
force.  If MSC adopts the HSV as a logistics solution, we see no reason to treat it 
differently than its other logistic assets.  This is in keeping with the outsourcing of most 
Navy logistic capabilities to MSC, which was accomplished both as a cost-saving 
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measure and to allow the Navy to focus its efforts on war fighting.  The WestPac Express 
currently operates with a crew of 14 civilians.  WestPac Express FY03 annual personnel 
costs were $2.9 million.24  The Joint Venture, a similarly sized vessel, has a crew of 40 
military personnel.  The main reason for manning differences lies in the specialization of 
Navy rates versus the versatility of MSC crewmembers.  Also, a military crew implies a 
military command structure, which requires more organizational levels and more 
administrative support.  Appendix E outlines the rank distribution for a notional military 
WestPac Express crew.  Using the Annual DoD FY04 Composite Rate25 indicates a 
military crew cost of $2.5 million, or $0.4 million less than civilian manning.  However, 
slight changes in the distribution of military pay grades could easily narrow this gap.   
 Traditionally, maritime logistic support to a war zone has not been an issue. MSC 
has had no difficulties in finding civilian crews.26  War bonus costs involving a doubling 
of regular salaries could become significant for long conflicts.27  However, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom lasted approximately two months.  Though the current global climate is 
marked by increases in low-intensity conflict and random terrorism, future US wars can 
be assumed to be both rare and short. 
 From an organizational viewpoint, it is hard to imagine a Navy officer seeking 
service onboard an HSV.  The military has demonstrated lower promotion opportunity 
for line officers not serving in line positions.  Service aboard a non-combatant would hurt 
promotion chances for most surface line officers.  Also, as an organization, the Navy 
does not like to focus on the running of its support functions, instead preferring to send 
its sailors to combatants.  All services struggle with this and it lies at the heart of the 
creation of a separate TRANSCOM, AMC and MSC.  Furthermore, a military crew 
would labor under OP-TEMPO restrictions, which limit the number of underway days for 
a fleet unit.  A MSC asset with a civilian crew would not have to contend with this 
limitation.     
 In case of special missions such as mine warfare or special warfare mother ship, 
the vessel could be turned over to a crew of reservists.  
 
23 WestPac Express visit, Naha port, 29OCT03 
24 WestPac Express Operating Costs, 12 Nov 2003 
25 Military Composite Standard Pay and Reimbursement Rates, DoN, FY04 
26 telephone conversation with Mr. John Hume 
27 ibid 
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IV.  NON-FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A.  CAPABILITY CONSIDERATIONS 
 HSVs, due to their nature as a transportation platform, lend themselves to a 
variety of military missions without having to undergo large re-construction.   In 2000, 
the US military chartered the HSV-X1 Joint Venture from the Australian manufacturer 
Incat.  This vessel is essentially the same as the WestPac Express.  The 98-m wave-
piercing catamaran underwent six weeks of modifications to allow it to meet military 
specifications.28  Joint Venture is to serve as a test for HSV technology and how its 
application can benefit the US military.  The results have been good: 
-In July 2002, during Fleet Battle Experiment Juliet, HSV-X1 served as a test platform 
for Navy Medicine to evaluate its suitability as a patient transport platform.  Potential 
missions include intra-theater patient evacuation, en route care, health service support 
logistics, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, Casualty 
Receiving Treatment Ship, disaster relief, Chemical, Biological and Radiological use and 
telemedicine.  Although the ship had to reduce speed in heavy seas to produce a smoother 
ride, initial results warrant further exploration in the future. 29 The Navy’s current 
hospital ships Mercy and Comfort are too big, too slow, and too vulnerable to be forward 
positioned.  HSVs can act as a link between scarce airborne lift (fast, but virtually no 
patient care) and hospital ships positioned in a safe location.  In comparison, a C-17 can 
carry 36 patient litters (patients on stretchers) and 54 ambulatory patients and 
attendants.30 
-In 2003, HSV-X1 completed the first circumnavigation of the globe by a US-flagged 
HSV. 
-During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Joint Venture served as a mother ship to US Special 
Forces clearing the waterways to Umm Qasr.  This helped reduce mission time by four 
days by shortening the transit to re-supply. 31  
 Indeed, HSV-X1 has proven so useful that the US military has acquired a second 
vessel: HSV-X2.  HSV-X2 Swift will serve as a mine warfare mother ship, replacing the 
now decommissioned USS Inchon.  She was handed over by Incat to the US Navy in a 
ceremony at the construction facility in Hobart on August 14, 2003.32  Evaluation of the 
 
28 Global Security.org web site 
29 Marks 
30 AF fact sheet 
31 Dao 
32 Defense Daily International 
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HSVs suitability as a mine-warfare platform is ongoing.  However, much emphasis is 
being placed on modular capabilities that can be removed when required elsewhere.  If 
the Mine Warfare Command decides on a modular capability as opposed to HSVs 
specifically built as mine warfare ships, then this would aid creation of an HSV logistic 
fleet.  Depending on the mission, MSC HSVs could bring up supplies or be turned over to 
mobile mine warfare units to secure sea lines of communication. 
B.  OTHER WESTPAC EXPRESS BENEFITS 
 Okinawa residents are ill at ease with the American military presence.  III MEF 
estimates that the use of the WestPac Express eliminated more than 200 AMC flights out 
of Kadena airport, thus reducing noise pollution in the surrounding civilian areas.  
Furthermore, Okinawa suffers from traffic congestion.33  The ability of the WestPac 
Express to load at Kin Red pier near the American forces has reduced the burden of 
American military presence on the civilian population. Large convoys of troops and 
materiel, rather than being required to travel to Kadena airport or Naha port through the 
heavy Okinawa traffic, can now load at base facilities. 
 Though this scenario seems unique to Okinawa, the military impact on civilian 
life is becoming a growing concern as the US becomes more densely populated.  Current 
and past issues include jet noise complaints in Virginia Beach, conducting routine 
military convoys at night on the German autobahn instead of during the day, and 
encroachment of planned civilian communities in California on military air lanes.  
Furthermore, congestion in the US transportation infrastructure continues to grow, 
especially in rail, highway and air transportation modes.34  The creation of HSV service 
may offer forward thinking use of the only comparatively under-used mode of US 
transportation: sea transport. 
C.  INDUSTRIAL BASE CONSIDERATIONS  
 The US shipbuilding industry has been in a steady decline since the end of World 
War Two.  Essentially it exists only to serve the domestic market and military sales.  As 
the US Navy has downsized, so has the shipbuilding industry.  The reasons for the 
decline are many, but can be reduced to two factors: inability to compete on price and 
failure to produce true innovation.35 
 
33 NWDC web site 
34 Tuttle & Wykle, pg 54 
35 Zoccola 
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 The market leaders in HSV technology are two Australian firms: Austal and Incat.  
They have captured a large fraction of the international fast ferry market.  However, 
commercial growth is expected to continue.  First, demand for ferries is increasing as 
world population and world trade grow, especially in the littorals.  Second, in a related 
development, traditional transportation networks such as railways, highways, and 
airfreight require increasingly large capital investments for incremental growth in 
capacity.  Under these circumstances, sealift becomes increasingly attractive because it 
already is the most cost-effective transportation mode and suffers from less congestion.36 
Third, as HSVs become faster and larger, their usefulness increases. 
 Austal and Incat are poised to take advantage of this increased demand.  
However, to participate in the lucrative US defense market, they have had to transfer 
technology and construction capability to the US.  DoD and Congress prefer allocating 
defense contracts to American companies in order to protect the country’s industrial base 
as well as garner local political support.  Thus, by setting up shop in the U.S., these 
Australian companies can circumvent many of their American competitors’ objections. 
Both Austal and Incat can produce three HSVs per shipyard per year.37  They have 
teamed up with Bender Marine and Bollinger respectively and created production 
facilities in the US.  These shipyards can construct another three vessels a year each.  
Furthermore, this infusion of technology and capital is creating American jobs and lays 
the foundation for an American shipbuilding industry with something to offer to the 
international market.  For further discussion, see Appendix A. 
D.  DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATIONS 
 Australia has been one of the staunchest US allies.  Partnering with the Australian 
companies Austal and Incat will help cement our alliance even further.  It is a signal that 
even small allies can successfully contribute to the collective defense of the free 
democracies.  It also underscores the benefits of supporting the US internationally. 
E.  TECHNOLOGY RISK 
 If the HSV is adopted as a transportation solution, the technology risk is low.  
High Speed Ferries like the WestPac Express have been constructed for more than a 
decade.  The true risk lies in the militarization of a civilian capability.  If force planners 
use this tool outside its original design parameters, costs will escalate.  However, as long 
as the HSV is used as a transportation platform, with additional capabilities being fitted 
 
36 Tuttle & Wykle, pg 54 
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to it as opposed to the HSV having to fit military desires, then technology risk should 
remain very low.  The military designs currently considered from Austal and Incat show 
a vessel that meets most current requirements without eliminating its root mission as a 
transportation device.  As specialized requirements continue to grow, so will technology 
risk, and hence cost.  
F.  CRFF 
 The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) has acted as a force multiplier for the Air 
Force.  For moving people and freight, civilian airlines have assets that can easily 
augment military transportation capabilities.  The price is subsidies in the form of 
favorable contracts during peacetime.  The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 
(VISA) has created a similar situation in the area of sealift.  With the expansion of HSV 
uses, MSC could conceivably create the Civil Reserve Ferry Fleet (CRFF).  This would 
give DoD the option to call HSVs operated by US companies into military service in time 
of war to augment fast sealift. 
G.  SURVIVABILITY 
 Any comparison with the C-17 would not be complete without addressing 
survivability.  Neither C-17 nor HSVs are designed as front-line combat units.  They 
provide logistic support to relatively secure areas.  Neither should be expected to handle a 
direct engagement with enemy aircraft or surface combatants. 
 The C-17 may face danger on the ground, primarily by enemy Special Forces or 
terrorists.  Mortar fire or any other explosive device could damage the aircraft.  However, 
it can be expected that a C-17 airfield will have perimeter security.  The greatest danger 
would come from shoulder-fired missiles launched as the C-17 is either landing or taking 
off.  If such a launch were successful, the result would be complete loss of aircraft and 
cargo. 
 An HSV is much more robust.  Shoulder-fired missiles could cause damage, but 
the damage would not likely be catastrophic.  The hull form allows for easy surveillance 
and the shallow draft makes it easy to check for swimmer mounted explosive devices 
such as limpet mines.  The Mine Warfare Command is currently evaluating the 
usefulness of HSVs as mine hunters.  The aluminum hull virtually eliminates a magnetic 
signature for the ship, thus eliminating the threat from magnetically triggered mines.  The 
shallow draft catamaran hull should both reduce the area a contact mine can hit as well as 
 
37 telephone conversation with Mr. John Hume 
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the pressure wave an influence mine would require for detonation.  Finally, the high 
speed of the HSV (42 knots) makes target motion analysis by enemy submarines (a 
submerged diesel submarine typically travels at 6 knots) very difficult.  Unless the HSV 
travels directly toward the submarine without zigzagging, it should have a good chance at 
evasion.  If a submarine did launch a torpedo, it would have to be close.  Most torpedoes 
travel at about 50 knots and, therefore, do not have a significant speed advantage over the 
HSV. 
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V.  MARKETING PLAN AND CONCLUSION 
A.  DEVELOPING A MARKETING STRATEGY 
 Within the next five years, we believe MSC should institutionalize HSV service 
in the III MEF Area of Responsibility (AOR) and investigate the expansion of the service 
into other theaters of operation.  A global HSV service with additional presence on the 
East Coast, the West Coast, the Mediterranean, and the Arabian Gulf should be 
considered. 
 MSC has a new service in the growing defense transportation market.  The HSV 
can rapidly move battalion-sized units and their equipment within a radius of 1500 
nautical miles.  All that is required is about 15 feet of water and a pier.  It accomplishes 
this more cost-effectively than AMC airlift.  Additionally, it offers the theater 
commander a flexible asset that can serve as a mine hunting platform, a special warfare 
mother ship, a floating hospital, or an emergency re-supply platform for humanitarian 
efforts.  The HSV is a force multiplier in that it reduces the cycle-time of in-theater joint 
and coalition forces as they move from garrison to staging area.  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
again demonstrated that US military forces couldn’t be deployed as fast as decision 
makers would like them to.  Though the HSV is not the cure, it can narrow the gap 
between current logistical capabilities and a desired future. 
B.  MARKETING IMPLEMENTATION 
 To market HSV service throughout DoD, MSC might build an HSV office that 
can fully support the institutionalization of the service in the III MEF AOR and further its 
expansion into other maritime theaters.  This HSV office should be able to accomplish 
the following: marketing, contract administration, manning, support, service liaison, and 
sales. 
1.  Marketing:  The marketing function requires the travel of MSC staff to 
theater commanders and educating them about the HSV capability.  For example, III 
MEF views the WestPac Express primarily as a people mover.  It will serve as an 
important mobilization asset in case of hostilities with North Korea, thus allowing a quick 
movement of fighting units from Okinawa to South Korea.  5th Fleet might use the HSV 
to support CENTCOM.  The vessel could routinely shuttle personnel and supplies 
between Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and afloat units – a sort of super “Desert 
Duck” ” (the fleet’s name given to the current logistic support shuttle: old H-3 
helicopters).  EUCOM might be interested in using the HSV as a logistical support unit 
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for US forces stationed in the Balkans with constant runs from Italy to Croatia.  The HSV 
could also support exercises throughout the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.  PACOM 
could use an HSV to re-supply bases on Pacific atolls from Guam or Hawaii.  Finally 
NORCOM might find useful an HSV that can move heavy equipment rapidly up and 
down the East Coast, thus bypassing a congested I-95.  The goal should be an organic 
theater logistic support asset, maintained by MSC and paid for by the customer. 
2.  Contract Administration:  This function would involve leasing HSVs from 
the builder.  These MSC personnel would let request for proposals and administer the 
contracts.  It would also involve the disposal of surplus units and perhaps oversight of a 
possible CRFF. 
3.  Manning:  The manning function would be responsible for hiring and training 
the civilian mariners manning the HSVs.  It would also oversee force protection 
requirements. 
4.  Support:  This function would oversee O&M accounts for the HSV fleet.  
Also, it would ensure accountability and support of any future expansion modules, for 
example, medical equipment to be installed in a hospital HSV, or pressure chambers for a 
mobile diving unit. 
5.  Service Liaison:  This function would negotiate the scheduling of HSVs for 
extra-Theater requirements.  For example, for the HSV to serve as a mine warfare 
platform, it would require manning and operation by Naval personnel.  The Liaison 
function would schedule the mine training and allow for the turnover of the asset to Navy 
active or reserve crews.  Also, in case of a theater conflict, the liaison function could 
marshal HSVs from other theaters to augment a Combatant Commander’s logistic 
capability. 
6.  Sales:   The Sales function would assist in the marketing and sale of HSVs to 
foreign militaries as well as US civilian operators.  For example, a US ferry service might 
be interested in purchasing military type HSVs which could be entered into the CRFF for 
a subsidy or favorable DoD contracts.  Or a Caribbean island nation might require 
assistance in obtaining a used MSC HSV. 
C.  HSV OFFICE COST ESTIMATE 
 Many of the above functions are routine within MSC.  A team of ten to fifteen 
should be able to handle the initial workload of an institutionalized HSV service. 
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D.  THE FUTURE 
 Technology is rapidly changing the way in which the war-fighter operates.  DoD 
must continually embrace this change and seek technologies that will be advantageous to 
the war-fighter.  As mentioned previously, much of this emerging technology is 
commercial off the shelf (COTS).  COTS technology allows DoD to use systems made 
for the commercial sector without having to pay high costs of research and development.    
Aluminum vessels are fast because they are considerably lighter than iron vessels 
and experience less drag than mono hulls.   
Early model testing indicates that fully loaded speeds of 60 knots are achievable, 
with the research team working towards speeds approaching 100 knots. A self-powered 
research model was tested in late 1999. Estimated speed reached by the craft is 60 to 70 
knots, with centre bow clear of the water, and water resistance approaching nil. Incat has 
been working on adaptations to the designs for military and coastal surveillance 
applications. 38 
 
Cost of operation is lower because lighter ships don’t require as much fuel.  Also, 
aluminum ships do not rust.  Aluminum vessels have a lower life-cycle cost because they 
require less maintenance as compared to steel vessels.  However, aluminum can be 
susceptible to cracking and corrosion around welds.39 
 Not only has the shape of vessels changed, but also the technologies within ships 
themselves have also changed considerably.  Technological advances have reduced the 
number of watch standers required onboard many vessels.  For example, a crew of four 
can operate the Joint Venture or the WestPac Express: a helmsman, a navigator, an 
engineer, and an engineering roving watch. 40   Engineering spaces can be monitored and 
controlled from gauges and surveillance systems located on the bridge.  Electronic 
Navigational Charts coupled with Electronic Chart Displays have come to the forefront to 
give mariners accurate, real-time navigation information.  These systems help mariners 
avoid catastrophes such as groundings and collisions.  They are also necessary to allow 
the safe operation of these ships at high speeds. 
 
38 Incat web site  
39 O’Neil 
40 LT Strenge, USN 
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On the design front, in addition to the current 98-m military concept, Incat has 
plans for a 112-m variant that will allow it to offer a larger, more capable platform to 
both military and commercial customers. 
The craft will provide high deadweight capacities operating in higher sea state 
conditions at 40 knot speeds [with an operating weight of 1000 deadweight tones] 
delivering high payload faction. Axle load limits are increased, vehicle deck clearances 
are raised and total deck area is maximized through innovative use of hoistable 
mezzanine vehicle decks, significantly boosting the vessel’s operating profile.41  
 
 Further technology initiatives include the construction of trimarans.  “In August 
1998, the UK Ministry of Defence awarded a contract to Vosper Thornycroft to construct 
the Trimaran, called RV (Research Vessel) Triton. The vessel was launched in May 2000 
and delivered in August 2000.”42   
Though the design is being evaluated as a possible alterna
Surface Combatant (FSC), extrapolation to a fast sealift pl
seems clear is that mono-hulls appear to have reached thei
refinements in hull form are no longer able to achieve sign
the other hand, a catamaran, a trimaran or a pentamaran de
hull surface area in contact with water, thus reducing drag
                                                 
41 Incat web site Source: Naval Technology.com
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a new era in Naval Architecture appears to dawn.  Indeed, Incat is currently constructing 
a 120-m passenger ferry!43 
E.  CONCLUSION 
 III MEF experience with the WestPac Express indicates that this is a capability 
desired by commanders.  We believe MSC, as DoD’s maritime logistics provider, should 
take the initiative and institutionalize HSV service within major theaters of operation.  
These vessels offer potential cost and time savings vis-à-vis traditional AMC airlift when 
used within an operational radius of 1,500 nautical miles and high utilization rates.  If 
implementation of this service could reduce DoD’s proposed C-17 buy by two aircraft, 
the program would be paid for and allow for service with III MEF, within the 
Mediterranean, within the Arabian Gulf/Red Sea, along the West Coast/Hawaii and the 
East Coast/Caribbean.  MSC should market this service to individual theater and 
component commanders since each customer’s requirements will differ.  However, HSVs 
are flexible enough to meet a variety of needs, now and into the future. 
 
42 Defense Industries 
43 Zilles 
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APPENDIX A 
HSV INDUSTRY 
 The shipbuilding industry is as international and varied as they come.  However, 
in the field of HSVs, Australia is a distant first, with two companies as champions of this 
new technology.  Austal and Incat control approximately 70% of the HSS market. 
A.  AUSTAL  
 Austal Limited is an Australian shipbuilder that specializes in the construction of 
aluminum high-speed passenger and cargo vessels for the commercial sector.  It consists 
of a diverse group of shipbuilding subsidiaries that include Austal Ships, Austal USA, 
Oceanfast and Image Marine.  Established in 1988, Austal has grown quickly to keep up 
with the demand for specialized HSF.  Austal-manufactured ships are currently operating 
worldwide.  As the largest manufacturer of HSFs, Austal custom builds each vessel to 
conform to the specifications demanded by its clients.   














Vessels < 50 m
Austal Limited
 
 In 1999, Austal USA was created in Mobile, Alabama in partnership with Bender 
Shipbuilding and Repair.  This partnership allows Austal to supply aluminum high-speed 
ships to a wide-open American market.  Austal USA began its production line in 2001 
and has since manufactured 3 vessels.44  The Jones Act, which requires commercial 
vessels operating within the US be built in the US, was the primary reason for Austal’s 
partnership with Bender.  As of Feb 1, 2003, Austal USA had three contracts pending for 
a total of four high-speed catamarans and one high-speed ferry.  The estimated value of 
these contracts is upward of 145 million dollars.45  Austal USA allows Austal to penetrate 
the US commercial market and also get a leg up on the competition in the military market 
based on the current interest expressed by DoD.  
 
44 Wiedemann 
45 Marine Log, March 2003, p 56 
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A military market for HSFs emerged after the Royal Australian Navy’s successful 
deployment of HMAS Jervis Bay.  Although Austal did not build Jervis Bay, it was in a 
good position to offer its ships to DoD.  Austal CEO John Rothwell, in a 2002 interview 
said, “We see the military needs for high speed vessels, particularly in the US as being a 
substantial market.”  Austal has diversified their product base with the acquisition of their 
current subsidiaries, but they definitely seem poised to market their vessels to the US 
military.  Rothwell went on to say, “I have great confidence in our future with military 
vessels.”46    In July 2003, the US Navy awarded 1 of 3 contracts to General Dynamics to 
conduct a preliminary design for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).  General Dynamics, 
which is teamed with Austal USA, based its proposal upon Austal’s 126-meter, high-
speed aluminum trimaran hull form.47 
B.  INCAT  
 Incat, based in Hobart, Tasmania, is an Australian company that specializes in the 
construction of High Speed Vessels.  Whereas Austal builds only to order, Incat follows a 
more speculative model.  This speculative model, i.e. build the ship first, then sell it, has 
caused Incat to build up a sizeable debt burden.  Indeed, the company has been in 
receivership.  However, the initiative may be paying off in that Incat has captured the 
majority of military contracts so far (only WestPac Express is Austal-built).  Incat has 
built over 40 percent of HSVs longer than 70 meters in existence in the world.48 
Incat has partnered with Bollinger Marine of Louisiana to set up production 
facilities in the US.  This will both increase the production capability and overcome US 
regulatory obstacles in the acquisition of foreign-made defense systems.  Technology 
transfer is underway.  Currently, Incat can build three HSV-type ships at Hobart per year.  









47 Marine Log, August 2003, p. 5 
48 Incat web site  
49 Baumgardner 
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APPENDIX B 
U.S. ARMY EFFORTS 
 
 The Army, with the Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM) in the lead, has 
taken a different approach to HSV acquisition.  HSV is seen as a solution to moving 
Stryker brigades more quickly. 
 The Army experienced great success on the Battlefield, but both Afghanistan and 
Iraq seemed to demonstrate an inability by the Army to project credible combat power as 
fast as decision makers would have liked.  In keeping with the theme of force 
transportation, which is seeking lighter, more mobile forces, the Army developed the 
Stryker Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).  The goal is to create a force of six IBCTs 
built around the Stryker Light Armored Vehicle, which fits into a C-130.  This would 
allow for a faster force. 
As an extension of this, the Army determined a need for 12 Theater Support 
Vessels (TSVs), to move the Brigade quickly.  They will replace the current fleet of 
General Frank S Besson, Jr.- class Logistics Support Vessels.50  Even with the Stryker 
fitting into a C-130, the size of the organization is such that sealift is still preferable.  
HSVs would allow a compromise solution.  The Brigade could be moved more quickly 
than conventional forces using traditional sealift, yet without absorbing AMC’s entire 
airlift.  Further, by naming the vessel a TSV, no challenge to the Air Force’s strategic 
mobility role is presented. 
 The first TSV has been chartered by TACOM in November 2002.  The 
Spearhead will be based at Diego Garcia. 51 
 
50Incat-Bollinger Team Delivers HSV-2 Swift To The Navy, pg.1.  
51 Proceedings, April 2003, pg 104. 
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APPENDIX C 
EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE 
 
 In September of 1998, a High Speed Sealift/Agile Port Executive Steering 
Committee (HSS/AP ESC) was created.  Members include USTRANSCOM, Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations N4/N42, Headquarters Department of the Army 
DCSLOG/DCSOPS, Maritime Administration, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 
NAVSEA PEO EXW, and Industry.  The primary purpose of the Executive Steering 
Committee is “to serve as a forum for stimulating innovation for engineering and material 
solutions to the nation’s high speed strategic sealift/agile port efforts.”52 
 HSVs fall under the aegis of the committee.  A HSS/AP AOG (Action 
Officers Group) has been formed and the respective action officers meet monthly to 
discuss issues and share information.  However, the evolution of the technology is now 
prompting plans for a HSS (High Speed Shipping) Technology Office.53   To further 
coordinate efforts, on 14 Aug 2003, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OSD AT&L) submitted a memorandum to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics and Technology) and Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) asking them to 
formalize coordination between their respective PEOs involved in High Speed Sealift 
research, development and procurement. 
 
52 MOA HSS/AP ESC 
53  Meeting Minutes, HSS/AP AOG, 28 July 2003 
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 A SWOT analysis is important to maintain focus on key issues.  It is an effective 
way to evaluate the internal strengths and weaknesses, as well as external opportunities 
and threats facing HSV as a new DoD transportation initiative.  This framework provides 
a great place to begin analysis of HSV.  
Strength 
 The strengths associated with HSV technology are varied in their composition, 
but all are important to the customer.  It is the strengths of this platform that have 
garnered it DoD attention.   
 This project’s analysis shows that HSV offers a cost savings and some time 
savings over comparative airlift as offered by AMC.  WestPac Express saved $8.7 
million compared to an estimated AMC cost of $20.7 million in FY03.  Time savings is 
seen when positioning a battalion of men and equipment less than 1500 miles.  The 
equivalent would take 14-17 days to move if accomplished by airlift.   
 Because WestPac Express is an organic asset controlled by the user and managed 
by MSC, USMC can count on better responsiveness than with airlift.  Currently, the U.S. 
is engaged in the war on terror and the war in Iraq, and the majority of strategic airlift is 
unavailable to conduct routine intra-theater airlift for training.  Thus, it is extremely 
difficult to schedule airlift with certainty.  WestPac Express is extremely important for III 
MEF’s ability to train.   
 The HSV is flexible.  It has an open cargo hold that allows for 33,000 square feet 
of cargo space.  It is able to carry a battalion-sized unit and equipment.  The continuity 
between troops and their gear is excellent with HSVs.  Troops arrive at their destination 
ready to fight.  In addition, these vessels can be outfitted to serve a variety of functions 
such as: hospital ship, cryptology suites for signals intelligence, Special Forces mother 
ship, etc.  The ability to adapt and allow such wide employment flexibility is unique to 
this type of vessel. 
 The maneuverability of HSV is remarkable.  HSVs are the fastest sealift available.  
Some vessels have the ability to travel at sustained speeds up to 50 knots.  WestPac 
Express, loaded to capacity is able to sustain 32 knots.  Its shallow draft of 14 feet offers 
access to most world ports.  Furthermore, the water jet propulsion system negates the 
need for tugs or line handlers; the ship’s crew can moor pier side unassisted. 
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Weakness 
 Currently, HSV is a transportation solution only.  It is not suited for a combat 
environment.  These vessels have aluminum hulls that make them lighter than traditional 
warships.  This vessel is built for speed, not combat survivability.  Its aluminum hull 
makes it more vulnerable than an iron ship.  Moreover, with the exception of HSV-X2 
Swift, these vessels are not equipped with any self-defense capabilities. 
 HSVs require port facilities and infrastructure to embark and disembark troops 
and equipment.  HSVs are currently unable to disembark equipment at sea.    The ramp 
configurations of some HSVs also make them less flexible, requiring certain mooring 
positions for embarkation and debarkation of equipment. 
 HSVs are most cost-effective when transporting equipment fully loaded.  The 
more equipment transported, the less money this mode costs as compared to airlift. 
 Weather conditions can also be prohibitive to HSV operations.  Shallow draft and 
large sail area make HSVs susceptible to damage from high winds pier side.  Underway, 
WestPac Express is unable to face 4m seas without the possibility of damage. 
 These vessels have yet to be modified to conduct alongside underway 
replenishment.   
Opportunity 
HSV is an excellent opportunity to take advantage of commercial off-the-shelf 
technology (COTS).  DoD can dramatically reduce non-recurring costs such as research 
and development costs, procurement, military construction costs, and technology 
investment costs when it buys these vessels.   
Even if DoD were set on buying these vessels, the cost is relatively low  as 
compared to a naval warship at $70 to $100 million.  The option is there however to lease 
these vessels.  DoD is currently leasing WestPac Express, Spearhead, Joint Venture, and 
Swift from Incat and Austal. 
HSV has the ability to quickly deliver heavy material and could support 
transformation initiatives such as Sea Basing and Sea Enterprise.  It also coincides with 
cutting-edge logistical concepts such as focused logistics, agile logistics, and velocity 
management. 
The design of HSVs is such that allows it to be adaptable and could potentially 
support missions such as Mine Warfare, Naval Special Warfare, Non combatant 
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Evacuation Operations, Humanitarian Assistance, Command and Control, Maritime 
Interdiction Operations, Homeland Security, Anti Terrorism Operations. 
Threat 
HSV technology is relatively new.  As a result, its technological risk will 
undoubtedly evolve.  These vessels would have to integrate with existing military 
capabilities and organization priorities.  HSVs would operate with current military ships 
using existing doctrine that may not complement its capabilities.   
The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are all interested in the capabilities of HSV.  
The priorities of these services will be different and the roles these vessels assume 
depend on which service they go to.  Additionally, it is possible that AMC will feel 
threatened by HSVs’ ability to move intra-theater cargo rapidly.   
Mission creep is a valid concern that has plagued many DoD acquisitions.  
Military modifications may take HSV beyond its initial commercial configuration, 
resulting in high costs that could reduce its attractiveness as well as civil-military 
flexibility. 
Failure to implement these vessels into military service may result in lost 
opportunities for DoD.  These losses may take the form of money, capabilities, 
technological advancement, and time. 
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HSV Monthly Costs FY02 and FY 0354 
HSV monthly cost 
FY 02 
FY 02        
  HSV    Estimated AMC Cost/mile Pass Miles & Cargo Miles 
             
                
Feb Charter $400,000      
  Fuel $221,365 PAX Cost $254,034 PAX mile          1,119,938  
  Port Cost $59,331 CARGO Cost $751,524 CARGO mile    1,755,724,000  
  Total $680,696  Total $1,005,558 Total    1,756,843,938  
            
Mar Charter $775,000      
  Fuel $362,033 PAX Cost $431,817 PAX mile          1,903,711  
  Port Cost $59,331 CARGO Cost $1,251,992 CARGO mile    2,924,928,000  
  Total $1,196,364  Total $1,683,809 Total    2,926,831,711  
            
Apr Charter $750,000      
  Fuel $523,544 PAX Cost $537,848 PAX mile          2,393,160  
  Port Cost $59,331 CARGO Cost $1,464,982 CARGO mile    3,422,519,600  
  Total $1,332,875  Total $2,002,830 Total    3,424,912,760  
            
May Charter $775,000      
  Fuel $328,495 PAX Cost $442,504 PAX mile          1,950,828  
  Port Cost $59,331 CARGO Cost $4,367,927 CARGO mile    2,575,892,600  
  Total $1,162,826  Total $4,810,431 Total    2,577,843,428  
            
June Charter $750,000      
  Fuel $322,814 PAX Cost $450,700 PAX mile          1,986,958  
  Port Cost $59,331 CARGO Cost $1,422,098 CARGO mile    3,322,332,000  
  Total $1,132,145  Total $1,872,798 Total    3,324,318,958  
            
Jul Charter $750,000      
  Fuel $219,415 PAX Cost $0 PAX mile                       -  
  Port Cost $59,331 CARGO Cost $276,264 CARGO mile       645,414,000  
  Total $1,028,746  Total $276,264 Total       645,414,000  
            
Aug Charter $775,000      
  Fuel $201,217 PAX Cost $293,665 PAX mile          1,294,655  
  Port Cost $59,331 CARGO Cost $619,885 CARGO mile     1,448,118,000 




       
                                                 
54 Cost Data provided by MSC. 
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Sep Charter $225,000      
  Fuel $41,036 PAX Cost $32,936 PAX mile             145,200  
  Port Cost $59,331 CARGO Cost $109,921 CARGO mile        256,800,000 
  Total $325,367  Total $142,857 Total       256,945,200  
 
HSV monthly cost55 
FY 03 
FY 03       
  HSV   Estimated AMC Cost/mile Pass Miles & Cargo Miles 
            
                
OCT Charter $775,000       
  Fuel $224,384 PAX Cost $530,050 PAX mile        2,065,666  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $1,991,755 CARGO mile  2,978,994,000  
  Total $1,066,780 Total $2,521,805 Total  2,981,059,666  
            
NOV Charter $750,000       
  Fuel $286,667 PAX Cost $580,083 PAX mile        2,260,652  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $2,391,753 CARGO mile  3,577,256,000  
  Total $1,104,063 Total $2,971,836 Total  3,579,516,652  
            
DEC Charter $775,000       
  Fuel $173,923 PAX Cost $167,355 PAX mile           652,200  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $633,030 CARGO mile     946,800,000  
  Total $1,016,319 Total $800,385 Total     947,452,200  
            
JAN Charter $775,000       
  Fuel $65,190 PAX Cost $144,491 PAX mile           563,098  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $476,812 CARGO mile     713,150,000  
  Total $907,586 Total $621,303 Total     713,713,098  
            
FEB Charter $739,648       
  Fuel $241,668 PAX Cost $368,169 PAX mile        1,434,797  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $1,320,582 CARGO mile  1,975,144,600  
  Total $1,048,712 Total $1,688,751 Total  1,976,579,397  
            
MAR Charter $862,792       
  Fuel $393,810 PAX Cost $424,337 PAX mile        1,653,692  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $1,477,380 CARGO mile  2,209,661,600  
  Total $1,323,998 Total $1,901,717 Total  2,211,315,292  
            
APR Charter $834,960       
  Fuel $238,929 PAX Cost $666,087 PAX mile        2,595,818  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $2,129,875 CARGO mile  3,185,575,000  




   
  
       
                                                 
55 A weighted average was used to calculate FY 03 Port Costs from known port charges. 
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MAY Charter $834,960       
  Fuel $325,740 PAX Cost $739,148 PAX mile        2,880,545  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $2,262,718 CARGO mile  3,384,263,000  
  Total $1,228,096 Total $3,001,866 Total  3,387,143,545  
            
JUN Charter $834,960       
  Fuel $462,656 PAX Cost $416,366 PAX mile        1,622,625  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $2,782,145 CARGO mile  4,161,149,600  
  Total $1,365,012 Total $3,198,511 Total  4,162,772,225  
            
JUL Charter $695,800       
  Fuel $37,089 PAX Cost $0 PAX mile 0 
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $0 CARGO mile 0 
  Total $800,285 Total $0 Total 0 
            
AUG Charter $862,792       
  Fuel $125,453 PAX Cost $291,758 PAX mile        1,137,013  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $697,923 CARGO mile  1,043,858,000  
  Total $1,055,641 Total $989,681 Total  1,044,995,013  
            
SEP Charter $869,648       
  Fuel $205,890 PAX Cost $118,742 PAX mile           462,753  
  Port Cost $67,396 CARGO Cost $129,230 CARGO mile     193,284,000  
  Total $1,142,934 Total $247,972 Total     193,746,753  
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Lease vs. Buy Analysis 
Lease





Est. Savings $1,170,982 $7,237,778 $6,573,173 $6,746,257 $6,714,148 $6,682,038 $6,609,128 $6,622,045










Savings $1,170,982 $7,237,778 $6,573,173 $6,746,257 $6,714,148 $6,682,038 $6,609,128 $6,622,045




one C-17 Personnel Costs Benefits
Purchase $236,700,000.00 Crew Number 14 Time $1,000,000
Salary/month $7,500 Impact $400,000
Maintenance Costs Shipbuilding $300,000
Cost Factor 0.3 US-Australia $100,000
Overhead Costs Add Mine $100,000
Cost Factor 0.04 Add Hospital $100,000
Discount Factor 0.1 Total $2,000,000
$5,150,000 $9,392,552 $9,930,000 $9,900,000 $9,900,000 $9,900,000 $9,930,000 $9,900,000
$2,694,650 $3,590,151 $3,691,746 $3,555,319 $3,586,193 $3,617,068 $3,657,174 $3,674,754
$313,786 $519,308 $544,870 $538,213 $539,448 $540,683 $543,487 $542,990
$8,158,436 $13,502,011 $14,166,616 $13,993,532 $14,025,641 $14,057,751 $14,130,661 $14,117,744
$4,987,454 $4,264,233 $5,593,443 $5,247,275 $5,311,492 $5,375,712 $5,521,533 $5,495,699
$5,918,775 $3,876,576 $4,622,680 $3,942,355 $3,627,821 $3,337,894 $3,116,761 $2,820,163
$5,918,775 $9,795,351 $14,418,031 $18,360,386 $21,988,206 $25,326,101 $28,442,862 $31,263,025
$100,000,000
$840,000 $1,260,000 $1,260,000 $1,260,000 $1,260,000 $1,260,000 $1,260,000 $1,260,000
$1,545,000 $2,817,766 $2,817,766 $2,817,766 $2,817,766 $2,817,766 $2,817,766 $2,817,766
$2,694,650 $3,590,151 $3,691,746 $3,555,319 $3,586,193 $3,617,068 $3,657,174 $3,674,754
$203,186 $306,717 $310,780 $305,323 $306,558 $307,793 $309,398 $310,101
$105,282,836 $7,974,633 $8,080,292 $7,938,408 $7,970,517 $8,002,627 $8,044,337 $8,062,620
$102,111,854 $1,263,145 $492,881 $807,849 $743,631 $679,411 $564,791 $559,424
$103,043,175 $1,148,313 $407,340 $606,949 $507,910 $421,861 $318,810 $287,073
$103,043,175 $104,191,488 $104,598,828 $105,205,777 $105,713,687 $106,135,548 $106,454,358 $106,741,431
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HSV speed 42 knots C-17 speed 450 knots
avg HSV load time 4 hours avg C-17 load time 1 hour/plane
mission completion mission completion
success probability 0.99 success probability 0.92
maintenance hours/ maintenance hours/
engine hour 0.45 hours flying hour 20 hours
1 17 8 1
Distance (NM) HSV time C-17 C-17 C-17
100 10 34 44 56
150 12 34 50 66
200 13 34 55 77
250 14 35 60 88
300 15 35 65 99
350 16 35 71 109
400 18 35 76 120
450 19 35 81 131
500 20 35 86 142
550 21 35 92 153
600 22 35 97 163
650 23 35 102 174
700 25 36 107 185
750 26 36 113 196
800 27 36 118 206
850 28 36 123 217
900 29 36 128 228
950 31 36 133 239
1000 32 36 139 250
1050 33 36 144 260
1100 34 36 149 271
1150 35 37 154 282
1200 37 37 160 293
1250 38 37 165 303
1300 39 37 170 314
1350 40 37 175 325
1400 41 37 181 336
1450 43 37 186 347
1500 44 37 191 357
1550 53 37 196 368 Assumption of 8 hrs HSV refueling stop
1600 54 38 202 379
1650 55 38 207 390
1700 56 38 212 400
1750 58 38 217 411
1800 59 38 223 422
1850 60 38 228 433
1900 61 38 233 444
1950 62 38 238 454
2000 64 38 243 465
3000 95 41 348 681 Assumption of 8 hrs HSV refueling stop
4500 139 44 505 1004 Assumption of 8 hrs HSV refueling stop
5000 151 45 558 1112
HSV formula break down
2 times the load time to simulate onload and offload +
distance divided by HSV speed
C-17 formula break down
17 is the required number of C-17s per battalion divided by the number of aircraft available *
2 times the load time to simulate onload and offload +
distance divided by C-17 speed
+
17 is the required number of C-17s per battalion minus the number of aircraft available *
distance divided by C-17 speed
+
17 is the required number of C-17s per battalion minus the number of aircraft available
divided by 5 *
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Crew Cost Comparison 
 
HSV - civilian crew HSV - notional military crew
# civilian crew 14 Number Paygrade Salary Total
HSV daily crew cost $7,913 1 0-4 $126,240 $126,240
above/person $565.21 2 0-3 $108,199 $216,398
annual salary civ $206,303 2 0-2 $83,672 $167,344
3 E-7 $78,918 $236,754
6 E-6 $68,746 $412,476
annual cost civ $2,888,245 9 E-5 $58,127 $523,143
annual cost mil $2,468,069 12 E-4 $48,452 $581,424
5 E-3 $40,858 $204,290
Savings -$420,176 40 $2,468,069












Fixed $9,392,552 Fixed $9,392,552
Price 0.2566 Price 0.0006686
Variable $3,590,151 Variable $3,590,151
x 50,595,101 x 9,708,872
Forecast: Break-even FY03 PAX-mile Forecast: Break-even FY03 ST-mile
Statistic Value Statistic Value
Trials 9,924 Trials 9,956
Mean 50,927,799 Mean 9,811,703
Median 50,523,040 Median 9,726,487
Mode --- Mode ---
Standard Deviation 6,337,350 Standard Deviation 1,244,736
Variance 40,161,999,899,883 Variance 1,549,368,125,544
Skewness 0.28 Skewness 0.35
Kurtosis 2.88 Kurtosis 3.04
Coeff. of Variability 0.12 Coeff. of Variability 0.13
Range Minimum 30,000,000 Range Minimum 6,000,000
Range Maximum 70,000,000 Range Maximum 3
Range Width 40,000,000 Range Width 8,000,000
Mean Std. Error 63,615.70 Mean Std. Error 12,474.84
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30,000,000 40,000,000 50,000,000 60,000,000 70,000,000
9,924 Trials













6,000,000 8,000,000 10,000,000 12,000,000 14,000,000
9,956 Trials
Forecast: Break-even FY03 ST-mile
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GLOSSARY 
 
long ton - A British weight, consisting of 112 pounds in the hundredweight and 2240 
pounds (1016.047 kilograms) in the ton.56 
 
metric ton – see tonne 
 
short ton – A weight used in the United States, consisting of 100 pounds in the 
hundredweight and exactly 2000 pounds (907.185 kilograms) in the ton.57 
 
ton (tn or T or t) - a traditional unit of weight equal to 20 hundredweight; see long ton 
and short ton 
 
tonne (t) - metric unit of mass equal to 1000 kilograms or approximately 2204.623 
pounds avoirdupois. The International System (SI) uses this French spelling for the 
metric ton to distinguish it clearly from the long and short tons of customary English 
usage. Large masses are often stated as multiples of the tonne, although technically the SI 
requires that masses be stated as multiples of the gram. Thus a mass of 103 tonnes = 106 
kg = 109 g is often called 1 kilotonne (kt) instead of 1 gigagram. In the United States, the 
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